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INTRODUCTION 
Incarceration as a means of rehabilitation is one of the most 
important American contributions to criminal punishment theory.  
In America’s early years, authorities imprisoned only political 
prisoners, while common criminals were tortured, killed, or 
pardoned.1  Members of the Quaker faith promoted incarceration as 
punishment based on the idea that everyone had the potential to be 
redeemed;2 therefore, imprisonment saved the lives of criminals and 
allowed them the time and repose to reform themselves.3  While 
rehabilitation has never completely disappeared as a criminal justice 
goal, by the mid-1970s, many people questioned the effectiveness of 
rehabilitation programs.4  In the 1990s, incarceration as retribution 
and incapacitation achieved dominance, as expressed by strict 
mandatory sentences and the “Get Tough on Crime” rhetoric.5 
America’s “War on Drugs” exemplifies problems associated with a 
policy of incarceration without rehabilitation.  Fueled by the crack-
cocaine epidemic of the 1980s, this “War” brought strict mandatory 
minimum sentences for drug offenses and flooded the jails and 
prisons with drug offenders.6  This response, however, did little to 
                                                 
 1. See THOMAS L. DUMM, DEMOCRACY AND PUNISHMENT:  DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 65-86 (U. Wis. Press 1987) (providing historical background to 
the growth of the penitentiary in American criminology). 
 2. Id. at 65; see also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 478 (2d ed. 1989) (revealing 
that the etymological origin of the word “penitentiary” means, in its original design, 
the reformation of convicts through personal repentance). 
 3. See DUMM, supra note 1, at 77 (explaining the Quaker belief that through 
personal reflection, everyone could find “God’s Inner Light” and be saved). 
 4. See Richard S. Gebelein, The Rebirth of Rehabilitation:  Promise and Perils of Drug 
Courts, 6 SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS:  ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, May 2000, at 1, 
2 (giving historical context for the rise and fall of rehabilitation as a popular 
punishment goal). 
 5. Id. at 2; see also Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties:  The 
Plight of Nonviolent Female Offenders and their Children, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 133 
(1999) (examining the dramatic increase in the incarceration rates of women and 
girls since the 1970s). 
 6. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, NAT’L ASS’N OF DRUG COURT PROF’LS, 
DEFINING DRUG COURTS:  THE KEY COMPONENTS 5 (1997) [hereinafter DRUG COURT 
STANDARDS COMMITTEE]; see also Ethan G. Kalett, Note, Twelve Steps, You’re Out (of 
Prison):  An Evaluation of “Anonymous Programs” as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS 
L.J. 129, 134 (1996) (characterizing the harsh sentences and political attitudes 
toward drug offenders as a manifestation of national frustration over addiction 
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“curtail the illicit use of drugs and alcohol,”7 but instead resulted in 
prisons crowded with drug offenders.8  Many see this as a policy 
failure, and have sought alternative approaches for dealing with drug 
offenders in the criminal justice system. 
Currently, many incarcerated drug offenders receive treatment for 
substance abuse in the correctional setting.9  However, the more 
promising recent developments for rehabilitation now occur outside 
prisons in programs and courts that send certain criminal offenders 
to treatment in the community, rather than prison.10  Among the 
most exciting of these developments are the drug treatment courts, 
often referred to simply as drug courts. 
Although neither drug courts nor criminal and addiction 
rehabilitation generally advocate a spiritual or religious reformation 
of the drug abuser, one of the most common addiction treatment 
support programs used in the drug courts does have religious 
components.11  Narcotics Anonymous and its precursor, Alcoholics 
Anonymous, are often a part of the treatment protocol assigned to 
drug court participants.12  Many commentators have noted the 
religious aspects of the 12-Step model on which these programs are 
based, such as the necessity of belief in a “Higher Power.”13  While the 
                                                 
problems). 
 7. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 5. 
 8. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUG AND CRIME FACTS (2002) (reporting 
that the number of drug arrests among adults almost tripled during the 1980s—from 
471,200 in 1980 to 1,247,800 in 1989), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ 
dcf.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review); Douglas Marlowe, Effective 
Strategies for Intervening with Drug Abusing Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 989, 997-98 (2002) 
(comparing a fifty-five percent recidivism rate for all criminal offenders with an 
eighty-five percent recidivism rate for drug offenders). 
 9. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT, STATE 
AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1997 10 (1999) (reporting that one in four prisoners in the 
United States participated in some kind of drug abuse program while incarcerated).  
But see Marlowe, supra note 8, at 998-1001 (concluding, based on several studies, that 
in-prison substance abuse treatment programs have little effect on long-term drug 
use or criminal recidivism).  
 10. See WILLIAM WHITE, SLAYING THE DRAGON:  THE HISTORY OF ADDICTION 
TREATMENT AND RECOVERY IN AMERICA 305 (1998) (providing alternatives to 
incarceration such as pre-arrest diversion to detoxification, post-arrest diversion to 
detoxification or counseling, and treatment as a condition of pre-trial release); see, 
e.g., THE NATIONAL GAINS CENTER FOR PEOPLE WITH CO-OCCURRING DISORDERS IN THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM, NEW OPTIONS FOR OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE 
USE DISORDERS (2001) (outlining a program that promotes diversion from jail to 
treatment for persons with co-occurring mental illness and substance abuse). 
 11. See Derek P. Apanovitch, Note, Religion and Rehabilitation:  The Requisition of 
God by the State, 47 DUKE L.J. 785, 790-91 (1998) (exploring the religious aspects of 
Alcoholics Anonymous, such as prayer and emphasis on theistic principles). 
 12. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE vii (2002) 
(giving an overview of elements of standard treatment protocols in drug courts). 
 13. See, e.g., Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 797 (finding that the religious 
components of 12-Step programs should prompt Establishment Clause scrutiny); 
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program model is widely recognized and widely regarded as 
successful, a large movement of individuals exists that dislikes the 12-
Step model for a number of reasons, including the religious 
content.14 
Several commentators have persuasively argued that state 
mandated participation in 12-Step programs violates the 
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution when included as a 
condition of probation or when a prisoner is required to attend in 
order to receive favorable treatment.15  While the drug court context 
fundamentally alters the analysis required by Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, this Comment ultimately argues that these distinctions 
do not change the results of the inquiry.  Specifically, mandated 12-
Step participation as a component of a drug court treatment program 
violates an individual’s First Amendment right to be free from 
government endorsed religion. 
To facilitate the analysis, Part II presents background information 
on drug courts.  Part III follows with an overview of 12-Step programs 
and explains why some courts have concluded that they are religious.  
Part IV delves into the Establishment Clause analysis, explaining the 
tests the Supreme Court developed to analyze challenged 
government action, how they have been applied in prison and 
probation contexts, and how they should be applied to drug court 
action.  Part V explores the popularity of 12-Step programs and some 
alternatives.  Additionally, this part presents a policy analysis, 
reasoning that it is inappropriate to try to rehabilitate addicts 
through programs that alienate them.  Finally, this Comment 
concludes by recommending that drug courts give participants the 
choice of a secular support group rather than just mandating 12-Step 
                                                 
Rachel F. Calabro, Note, Correction Through Coercion:  Do State Mandated Alcohol and 
Drug Treatment Programs in Prisons Violate the Establishment Clause?, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 
565, 595, 613 (1998) (concluding that, based on its history, continuing traditions and 
incorporation of prayer, Alcoholics Anonymous is properly considered a religion). 
 14. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 156-57 (listing some frequent criticisms of the 12-
Step approach, including the complaints that the model only treats symptoms and 
not the underlying cause of addiction; that the programs tend to disempower 
participants; that the program ignores environmental factors like socio-economic 
status; and that the religious language and concepts keep many addicts from wanting 
to become affiliated with a 12-Step program). 
 15. See, e.g., Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 851 (concluding that the principle of 
separation of church and state dictates a finding that government promotion of 12-
Step programs is unconstitutional); Calabro, supra note 13, at 613 (arguing that 
compulsory 12-Step participation in prison is unconstitutionally coercive); Michael 
G. Honeymar, Jr., Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation:  When 
Does it Amount to Establishment of Religion?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 471 (1997) 
(contending that compulsory attendance to Alcoholics Anonymous as a condition of 
probation for a drunk driving offense is a violation of the Establishment Clause). 
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programs, and suggesting that professional organizations concerned 
with drug courts promote this change. 
I. WHAT IS A DRUG COURT? 
Drug courts are specialty courts that apply legal pressure to prod 
drug offenders and other substance-involved defendants  to complete 
substance abuse treatment instead of receiving a traditional 
punishment.  This is done in the hope that remedying someone’s 
addiction will remove that participant’s incentive to commit future 
crimes.16 
What has turned into an international movement17 began in 1989 
with an experimental judicial program in Dade County, Florida.18  
The innovations of the first drug court emphasized “drug treatment, 
responsibility, and accountability,”19 and created a setting in which 
the judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney worked together as a 
team to promote successful treatment of the offender.20  The 
program developed as a practical response to the extreme pressure 
the courts and correctional system experienced as a result of the 
explosion of drug cases that accompanied the War on Drugs.21  While 
the reason behind the innovation was to serve court efficiency, and 
                                                 
 16. See generally DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 7 
(explaining that the mission of drug courts is to stop criminal activity by stopping 
drug abuse). 
 17. See infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing the global expansion of 
the drug court system). 
 18. See John S. Goldkamp, The Origin of the Treatment Drug Court in Miami, in THE 
EARLY DRUG COURTS:  CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INNOVATION 19, 19 (W. Clinton Terry, 
III ed., 1999) (discussing the creation of Miami’s drug court, which undertook the 
bold step of fully integrating treatment into the court setting, contrary to 
contemporary drug policy). 
 19. Id. at 22. 
 20. Id.  The public defender involved in the program was initially hesitant to 
promote the drug court model because of concerns that the length of the program 
was longer than the sentences many defendants would receive otherwise.  Id. at 22-
23.  Further, the public defender had concerns that the due process rights of clients 
might not be protected when judges and prosecutors teamed up with defense 
attorneys, who would otherwise function solely for their client.  Id.; see also Richard 
Boldt, The Adversary System and Attorney Role in the Drug Treatment Court Movement, in 
DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 121, 122 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002) 
(arguing that the drug court’s departure from the traditional adversarial model is 
cause for concern because the defense attorney is no longer dedicated to the client’s 
legal needs). 
 21. See Goldkamp, supra note 18, at 21-22 (highlighting the crisis, and the 
desperation of criminal justice leaders to make an impact on the situation).  Other 
courts have been quick to adopt, and adapt, the Miami model.  See The Honorable 
Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement:  Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime 
in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 456 (1999) (illustrating how the drug court 
model spread primarily through a grassroots movement of judicial innovation, rather 
than through top-down, legislative action). 
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not to improve addicts’ lives, the court chose to address the problem 
through rehabilitation of drug-addicted offenders.22 
This mixture of criminal and addiction rehabilitation concepts has 
proved to be successful and enormously popular.  Today there are 
1,160 drug courts in operation, with 517 more in the planning 
stages.23  There is at least one local drug court in all fifty states, plus 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam, and one federal 
district;24 additionally, the drug court model is being replicated 
abroad.25  By incorporating advances in addiction research into their 
program design, drug courts ensure that the means used for 
promoting recovery will be tested and proven.26  The programs are 
still developing, but many studies point to lower recidivism and 
increased well-being for drug court graduates, while also benefiting 
participants that did not graduate.27 
                                                 
 22. See John Terrence A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Drug Treatment 
Courts:  Integrating Law and Science, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 157, 
157 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002) (explaining that the rehabilitative theory of 
punishment does not necessarily underlie drug court programs; rather the programs 
are aimed at easing caseloads by reducing recidivism, which is accomplished through 
rehabilitation).  A number of scholars have, however, noted a connection between 
the creation of drug courts and the therapeutic jurisprudence theory.  See, e.g., Hora, 
supra note 21, at 442 (noting that the legal theory of therapeutic jurisprudence, 
which examines the impact of the legal system on individuals, can provide a guiding 
legal theory for the drug courts); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug Treatment 
Court:  Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, 18 TOURO L. REV. 479, 480 (2002) (describing 
drug courts and other “problem-solving courts” as applications of the theory of 
therapeutic jurisprudence); Jeffrey S. Tauber, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Holds Potential 
for Drug Offenders, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WKLY., Dec. 3, 2001, at 5 (recognizing 
the opportunity to merge the academic discipline of therapeutic jurisprudence with 
the pragmatic foundation of drug courts).  When analyzed from this framework, the 
focus shifts from the impact on the particular court system to the rehabilitative 
impact on the defendant involved, as well as how the community at large is affected.  
See generally Hora, supra note 21 (suggesting that therapeutic jurisprudence and drug 
courts can enrich each other as disciplines). 
 23. JUSTICE PROGRAMS OFFICE, AM. UNIV., SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY BY 
STATE AND COUNTY (May 2004), available at http://spa.american.edu/justice/ 
publications/drgchart2k.pdf. 
 24. Id. 
 25. James L. Nolan, Jr., Separated by an Uncommon Law:  Drug Courts in Great Britain 
and America, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 89 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 
2002) (stating that the American drug court model has been replicated in Australia, 
Canada, England, Ireland and Scotland). 
 26. See Goldkamp, supra note 18, at 27-32 (describing some of the innovations 
influenced by addiction research, such as the flexibility to allow some failed drug 
tests, based on the understanding in the treatment community that a single misstep 
does not indicate a total failure); see also Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 161 (explaining 
that all drug courts shape their programs based on advances in the understanding of 
addiction in order to maximize the chances of achieving sustained sobriety for the 
offender). 
 27. See Gebelein, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that reduced criminal recidivism is 
observed even in offenders who participated in but did not graduate from drug 
court); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRUG COURT PROFESSIONALS, DRUG COURT 
RESEARCH SHOWS, at http://www.nadcp.org/whatis/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2004) (on 
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Drug courts depart dramatically from typical courts by focusing on 
stopping the substance abuse presumed to be the root cause of the 
defendant’s criminal activity, rather than on the charged criminal 
activity.28  This method abandons the traditional adversarial approach 
of prosecution and defense, and replaces it with the two sides 
working together as a team, along with the judge and treatment 
provider.29  Drug courts vary widely in their particular approach, but 
generally they require a defendant to plead guilty to the criminal 
charges, or the court defers charges pending treatment.30  In 
exchange for successfully completing treatment, drug courts 
generally dismiss the original charge, or set aside the sentence.31 
A drug court participant must appear before the court fairly often, 
and undergo frequent drug testing to ensure treatment compliance.32  
The in-court interactions with the judge tend to be informal, and 
ongoing successes or setbacks in recovery receive, respectively, 
immediate rewards or sanctions.33  Each participant is assigned to a 
                                                 
file with the American University Law Review) (claiming that drug court clients 
substantially reduce their drug use and criminal behavior, and that criminal behavior 
remains low after graduation).  But see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS:  
OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS 14 (1997) (suggesting that 
current studies have not yet definitively answered the question of whether drug 
courts work). 
 28. See DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 5-7 (describing the 
revolving door of arrest, prosecution, conviction, imprisonment, and release through 
which the traditional criminal justice system sends drug offenders); Boldt, supra note 
20, at 119 (explaining the intertwined premises supporting drug court programs:  
that the disease of substance abuse often leads directly to criminal acts, that drug-
addicted offenders do not receive adequate treatment in the traditional correctional 
setting, and that substance use and criminal behavior will continue after the period 
of incarceration is complete). 
 29. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 6; see also JAMES L. 
NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE:  THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 40 (2001) 
(explaining that for many routine drug court appearances, the lawyers do not even 
attend, and if they do, they may not even be recognizable as defense attorneys or 
prosecutors). 
 30. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 41 (providing an explanation of the 
mechanisms to enter drug court pretrial/preplea, pretrial/postplea, postconviction, 
or some combination of these events); see also Juanita Bing-Newton, What Does the 
Future Hold for Drug Courts?:  Eleventh Annual Symposium on Contemporary Urban 
Challenges, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1858, 1881 (2002) (expressing concern over the 
Fourth Amendment implications of treating a defendant as guilty without a trial or 
plea). 
 31. DRUG COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 7. 
 32. See Gebelein, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that courts require defendants to 
appear in court as often as several times a week, and that drug tests are frequent and 
random). 
 33. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 40 (listing as incentives offered judicial 
praise, applause, or prizes such as t-shirts, key-chains, mugs, donuts, or candy, along 
with graduation ceremonies that include cake, speeches, visits from local dignitaries 
and media coverage).  In addition to general expressions of judicial disapproval, 
sanctions include community service, short jail stays, required increase in 12-Step 
participation or time in the jury box during other drug court sessions.  Id.; see 
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specific treatment regimen that may include inpatient or outpatient 
treatment, individual and group counseling, and development of 
various coping strategies.34  One of the common features of treatment 
protocols is assignment to a 12-Step program.35  Likewise, a common 
sanction for a failed drug test or other treatment setback is a mandate 
to attend supplementary 12-Step sessions.36 
Most drug court entry procedures begin with a two-step screening 
process soon after arrest to determine who will be offered the 
opportunity to enter the drug court.37  The first step is a judicial 
screening to determine if the arrestee meets the eligibility 
requirements set by each individual court.38  Eligibility criteria 
include factors such as criminal history,39 extent of substance abuse 
dependency,40 and current criminal charge.41  The second part of the 
                                                 
generally Rosenthal, supra note 22, at 161 (explaining that the traditional criminal 
justice system often serves as an unwitting enabler because the slow and deliberative 
procedures delay consequences for actions, and traditional defense counsel can 
reinforce an addict’s denial of a drug problem). 
 34. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 41 (providing details of the range of 
treatment options available to different courts, such as private treatment facilities, 
county health departments, outpatient treatment, and residential facilities). 
 35. See id. at vii (noting that treatment protocols generally include the support of 
regular 12-Step participation, group counseling sessions, craving-relieving 
acupuncture, and regular reports to the drug court judge). 
 36. See id. (confirming that penalties for drug use during rehabilitation include 
Narcotics Anonymous meetings, community service, and jail time). 
 37. See W. Clinton Terry, III, Judicial Change and Dedicated Treatment Courts:  Case 
Studies in Innovation, in THE EARLY DRUG COURTS:  CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL 
INNOVATION 1, 5 (W. Clinton Terry, III ed., 1999) (explaining that the intervention is 
designed to be swift in order to capitalize on the ordeal of the arrest and to engage 
the individuals while their motivation to reform is high). 
 38. See ROGER H. PETERS & ELIZABETH PEYTON, AM. UNIV., GUIDELINES FOR DRUG 
COURTS ON SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT 3 (1998) (summarizing a typical drug court 
screening process, in which the judge and prosecutor make the final decision on 
eligibility), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/171143.pdf. 
 39. See CAROLINE S. COOPER, 2000 DRUG COURT SURVEY REPORT, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 21 (2001) (explaining that because federal funding is only available to 
programs that exclude persons convicted of violent offenses, a non-violent criminal 
history is required to enter most drug courts), available at http://spa.american.edu/ 
justice/publications/execsum.pdf.  Federal funding became available to drug courts 
with the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1994, which 
authorized the Attorney General to make grants to states, localities, and tribal 
authorities to establish drug courts for non-violent drug offenders.  42 U.S.C. § 3769 
(1994). 
 40. See COOPER, supra note 39, at 22 (reporting that all programs target drug 
users with moderate illegal substance use, and that 90 percent of programs target 
individuals with severe substance abuse problems).  Most programs also accept 
individuals with alcohol addictions, although usually only when the alcohol problem 
is also associated with a drug addiction.  Id. 
 41. See id. at 21 (stating that all drug court programs indicated that they accept 
participants charged with drug possession, while a smaller percentage allow 
individuals into the program charged with small drug sales, property offenses, 
DUI/DWI, financial or prescription forgeries, and prostitution).  Certain factors 
such as gang membership, out of county residence, current probation or parole 
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screening process involves a clinical screening to determine if the 
arrestee actually has an addiction or substance abuse problem that is 
likely to benefit from available treatment.42  The clinical screening 
also determines whether there are other clinical features, such as a 
psychiatric disorder that could compromise the potential 
participant’s success in overcoming the addiction.43 
If the screening reveals arrestees that are eligible, and they choose 
to enter the drug court, then each must continue to meet the court 
requirements for a specified amount of time before exiting 
successfully.44  Most drug courts require participants to remain “clean 
and sober” for twelve consecutive months in addition to other 
obligations, such as earning a high school diploma or GED and 
obtaining a job before they can “graduate.”45 
Courts punish minor infractions or an occasional failed drug test 
with intermediate sanctions, such as a brief detention in jail, or 
greater treatment requirements.46  However, if the infractions are 
more constant, the drug court team may conclude that the individual 
will not succeed in the program at all.47  If the team reaches this 
conclusion, the individual will fail out of drug court, and the case will 
be remanded back to the traditional criminal court for trial or 
sentencing.48 
It is important to note that drug courts are local creations, 
designed by the judges sitting in individual  jurisdictions.49  As such, 
                                                 
status, mental illness, or lack of transportation can disqualify a potential participant 
in various drug courts.  Id. at 22. 
 42. PETERS & PEYTON, supra note 38, at 3. 
 43. COOPER, supra note 39, at 8.  According to a 1997 survey, over one-half of the 
existing drug courts maintained services for persons with co-occurring psychiatric 
and substance use disorders, but judges did not believe they were adequately 
equipped with an understanding of how a mental illness could affect an individual’s 
experience in drug court. DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
PROJECT, ISSUES MEMORANDUM:  DRUG COURT CLIENTS WHO ARE DUALLY DIAGNOSED 
(June 1997), available at http://spa.american.edu/justice/publications/dualdiag. 
htm. 
 44. See generally Terry, III, supra note 37, at 7-8 (describing the central role of the 
judge as a problem-solver in developing the specific requirements designed to 
address the addictions and criminal behaviors of each participant). 
 45. James J. Hennessy, Introduction:  Drug Courts in Operation, in DRUG COURTS IN 
OPERATION:  CURRENT RESEARCH 1, 6 (James J. Hennessy & Nathaniel J. Pallone eds., 
2001). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Elaine M. Wolf, Systemic Constraints on the Implementation of a Northeastern 
Drug Court, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 27, 40-44 (James L. Nolan, Jr. 
ed., 2002) (chronicling the treatment non-compliance of a drug court participant, 
including daily use of drugs, that led the team to consider failing him even after 
nineteen months in the program). 
 48. Hennessy, supra note 45, at 7. 
 49. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 42 (quoting drug court judge Henry Weber 
describing the spread of drug courts as “a grassroots kind of movement”).  He 
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there are numerous variations intended to meet local needs.50  
Therefore, any constitutional analysis of a specific drug court 
program that is based on individual program features may not be 
applicable to all drug courts.  However, major themes and similarities 
pervade the drug court context and allow for general discussion.51 
II. WHAT 12-STEP PARTICIPATION ENTAILS 
Generally, 12-Step programs play small, but important, roles in the 
treatment plans designed for drug court participants.52  The 12-Step 
program does not function as the primary treatment component, but 
rather supplements other treatment elements.53  The 12-Step model, 
which was originally developed by Alcoholics Anonymous,54 has been 
replicated in numerous programs that address a variety of addictions, 
                                                 
continues, “It’s not something where bureaucrats in Washington tell you what to do. 
Each community has developed its own program for its own particular needs and 
they all deal with it on a local level.” Id.; see also Terry, III, supra note 37, at 6 
(characterizing local variations in drug programs as critical to the success of drug 
courts because of the weight of local tradition in the American criminal justice 
system). 
 50. See generally COOPER, supra note 39 (noting the distinguishing features of each 
court, such as eligibility criteria, treatment components, and sanctions). 
 51. Despite the local variations, there are some common factors.  See DRUG 
COURT STANDARDS COMMITTEE, supra note 6, at 9-37 (listing key components of drug 
courts as follows:  (1) integrated treatment with justice system case processing;       
(2) non-adversarial approach; (3) eligible participants identified early; (4) access to a 
continuum of treatment and rehabilitation services; (5) abstinence monitored by 
frequent drug testing; (6) coordinated strategy governing responses to compliance; 
(7) ongoing judicial interaction with participants; (8) evaluation measuring program 
goals; (9) continuing interdisciplinary education promoting effectiveness of 
program; and (10) partnerships forged with the community to enhance the 
effectiveness of the program). 
 52. See, e.g., DUCKWATER SHOSHONE TRIBAL DRUG COURT, TREATMENT PROGRAM 
REQUIREMENTS, available at http://spa.american.edu/justice/publications/duck 
waterjuvrequirements.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) (listing drug court’s specific 
requirements for the initial phase to include twice-weekly meetings with a social 
worker, twice-monthly individual counseling sessions, four-times-weekly drug testing, 
twice-weekly 12-Step attendance, twice-monthly appearances at drug court, 
attendance to two “sober activities” planned by the social worker, general education 
advancements, and education and counseling specific to addiction issues such as 
fetal alcohol syndrome and HIV); see also COOPER, supra note 39, at 8 (explaining that 
the range of services provided by most drug courts has expanded to include services 
ancillary to formal addiction treatment, such as support for family problems, 
employment, and self-esteem). 
 53. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 175-76 (explaining that formal treatment is 
focused on initiating sobriety, while mutual aid programs like Alcoholics Anonymous 
work to help individuals sustain that sobriety).  Addiction treatment involves 
diagnosis and interventions by doctors or therapists that target the cravings and 
compulsions of addictive behavior.  Alcoholics Anonymous, on the other hand, 
claims no expertise in addiction science, but looks only to help alcoholics get 
through each day without drinking.  Id. 
 54. See id. at 127-32 (establishing that, while mutual aid groups existed long 
before the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous in 1935, it was Alcoholics Anonymous 
founder Bill Wilson who compiled the influential 12-Step program). 
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such as drug use, gambling, and overeating.55  These offshoots tend to 
remain loyal to the basic structure of Alcoholics Anonymous, despite 
the different vices they address.56  While the Alcoholics Anonymous 
organization is adamant that the 12-Step model that is the foundation 
for each of these programs is not religious,57 many courts and 
commentators find differently, based on the history of the 
organization and the current meeting practices.58 
A. Spiritual Beginnings of Alcoholics Anonymous 
The founders of Alcoholics Anonymous were “enthusiastic 
members” of the Oxford Group Movement, a non-denominational, 
evangelical Christian movement.59  This movement taught 
participants to publicly confess their sins, surrender to guidance from 
God, and carry their religious message to others.60  Alcoholics 
Anonymous tells its own history in what is termed “The Big Book,”61 
including the colorful story of founder Bill Wilson’s alcoholism and 
the epiphany that led to his recovery.62 
                                                 
 55. See KLAUS MÄKELÄ ET AL., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS AS A MUTUAL–HELP 
MOVEMENT:  A STUDY IN EIGHT SOCIETIES 217 (1996) (providing background 
information on the offshoots of Alcoholics Anonymous, including Narcotics 
Anonymous, which is particularly important to the drug court context).  The 
Narcotics Anonymous program, formed in 1953, was originally a branch of 
Alcoholics Anonymous for members with both alcohol and drug problems, but it 
soon gained organizational independence.  Id. 
 56. Id.  See generally CHARLES BUFE, ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS:  CULT OR CURE? 64-66 
(2d ed. 1998)(stating that the philosophy of the 12–Step program requires addicts to 
admit their addictions and their personal powerlessness to overcome them).  
Through the 12-Steps and life-long fellowship with other program members, 
participants are supposed to gain strength to achieve abstinence.  Id. 
 57. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (asserting that Alcoholics 
Anonymous does not purport to align itself with religious doctrine). 
 58. See infra notes 75, 82-87 and accompanying text (noting that, although 
Alcoholics Anonymous insists it is not religious, many courts have determined that its 
references to God violate the Establishment Clause). 
 59. BUFE, supra note 56, at 14-15. 
 60. Id. at 18. 
 61. BILL W., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS:  THE STORY OF HOW MANY THOUSANDS OF 
MEN AND WOMEN HAVE RECOVERED FROM ALCOHOLISM (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter BIG 
BOOK]. 
 62. See id. at 9-13 (giving Wilson’s account of the inspiration for the 12-Step 
movement).  He claims that the movement began when he was visited by an old 
friend and former drinking companion who explained his restraint from drinking by 
proclaiming, “I’ve got religion.”  Id. at 9.  Amazed at the recovery of his friend, 
Wilson experienced an epiphany regarding the possibility of recovery through 
spirituality.  Id. at 11.  The triumphant crescendo to Wilson’s story reads as follows: 
There I humbly offered myself to God, as I then understood Him, to do with 
me as He would.  I placed myself unreservedly under His care and direction.  
I admitted for the first time that of myself I was nothing; that without Him I 
was lost. I ruthlessly faced my sins and became willing to have my new-found 
Friend take them away, root and branch. I have not had a drink since. 
Id. at 13. 
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Alcoholics Anonymous does not espouse any particular religious 
doctrine.  On the contrary, the Big Book goes to pains to explain that 
any sect will do.63  It further explains that the references to “God” in 
Alcoholics Anonymous programs are not meant to be limited to any 
set doctrinal formulation of the Deity.64  Instead, the book instructs 
readers to apply their “own conception of God.”65 
Despite this non-denominational bent, however, it is clear that 
monotheistic spirituality is at the heart of Alcoholics Anonymous.66  
Notably, there is a chapter in the Big Book addressed to agnostics 
and atheists that rebukes non-believers.67  It explains that agnostics 
and atheists cannot overcome their addiction without a belief in a 
higher power.68  According to this principle, such individuals only 
benefit from the program if they cease to be atheistic or agnostic.69  
Though Alcoholics Anonymous does not consider addiction a moral 
failing,70 it is clear that spirituality is required for recovery.71 
B. Current 12-Step Practices 
The 12-Steps described in the Big Book continue to be central to 
Alcoholics Anonymous and its progeny.72  As part of their recovery-
                                                 
 63. See id. at 45-46 (explaining the 12-Step belief, which holds that there is not 
just one way that faith can be acquired, but that all humans can form their own 
personal relationship with the Higher Power as long as they are honest and willing to 
make the attempt). 
 64. Id. at 47. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Kerr v. Farey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996) (asserting that “a 
straightforward reading of the twelve steps shows clearly that the steps are based on 
the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme Being”); BUFE, supra note 56, at 64 
(explaining that the 12-Steps were drawn directly from Oxford Group teachings, 
compiled by Bill Wilson who believed he was working under divine guidance).  The 
author states that there is no mistaking the “overtly religious nature of the steps.”  Id. 
 67. BIG BOOK, supra note 61, at 44. 
 68. See id. at 50 (stating that many of the original members of Alcoholics 
Anonymous had been atheistic and had denied that they were alcoholics, but that 
they eventually understood that they needed a spiritual basis for addiction recovery). 
 69. See id. at 44-45 (equating acceptance of religion with admitting an addiction, 
and thus necessary for starting on the road to recovery). 
 70. See id. at 33 (presenting a medical theory for addiction that prevents an 
individual from ever fully recovering); WHITE, supra note 10, at 151 (stating that 12-
Step members use terms such as “allergy, illness, sickness and disease” to describe 
their addictions).  But see id. at 330 (explaining that in the larger political 
community, addiction often is characterized as a moral failing, rather than a medical 
disease). 
 71. See BIG BOOK, supra note 61, at 44 (asserting the belief that a “mere code of 
morals or a better philosophy of life” would be insufficient to overcome addiction; 
rather, an acceptance of spirituality is required). 
 72. See BUFE, supra note 56, at 65 (describing the zealous endorsement of the 12-
Steps by members of Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, and other 12-
Step groups); see also BIG BOOK, supra note 61, at 59-60 (laying out the 12-Steps as 
follows: 
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support process, members work their way through each step with the 
encouragement of their peers.73  Religious concepts pervade the 
traditions of many 12-Step programs, including prayers to open and 
close meetings.74 
C. Judicial Consideration of the Religious Nature of 12-Step Programs 
In determining whether the 12-Step program model can be 
characterized as religious, courts rely on factors such as the spiritual 
themes and practices, as well as the primary purpose of the 
organization.75  While this Comment agrees with the many 
                                                 
1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol—that our lives had become 
unmanageable. 
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to 
sanity. 
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God as we 
understood Him. 
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves. 
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact 
nature of our wrongs. 
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character. 
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings. 
8. Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make 
amends to them all. 
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do 
so would injure them or others. 
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly 
admitted it. 
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact 
with God as we understood Him, praying only for knowledge of His will for us 
and the power to carry that out. 
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to 
carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our 
affairs. 
(emphasis in original)). 
 73. See Ethan G. Kalett, Twelve Steps, You’re Out (of Prison):  An Evaluation of 
“Anonymous Programs” as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 129, 143 (1996) 
(describing a typical meeting in which a speaker shares her or his story of addiction, 
followed by open discussion of common experienced the participants share as 
persons recovering from addiction); BUFE, supra note 56, at 66 (explaining that the 
steps provide a structure and clear directions for the recovering addicts to follow). 
 74. See Calabro, supra note 13, at 598 (reporting that 12-Step meetings often 
begin with a group recitation of the Serenity Prayer and end with the participants 
joining hands and reciting the Lord’s Prayer).  Both prayers are distinct to western 
Christianity.  Id.; see also BUFE, supra note 56, at 65-66 (claiming that many who 
adhere to the 12-Step practices experience religious conversions in part because of 
the emotional vulnerabilities caused by their attempts to stop abusing substances). 
 75. See Honeymar, Jr., supra note 15, at 444-45 (explaining that, though in many 
instances the determination of what is “religious” is a complex academic 
investigation, in the case of the 12-Step program, the quintessential religious ideas of 
prayer and theism that are part of the 12-Step philosophy make the determination 
much simpler). 
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commentators that conclude that 12-Step programs are religious,76 
courts have had differing opinions.77 
In Stafford v. Harrison,78 for example, to support a finding that 
Alcoholics Anonymous is not religious, the court relied on the fact 
that the “Higher Power is expressly left to the definition of the 
individual.”79  Likewise, in Youle v. Edgar,80 the court reasoned that, as 
the primary function of the organization was to cope with addiction 
and not to proselytize, it was not religious.81 
                                                 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 445 (characterizing the determination of religiousness of 
Alcoholics Anonymous as an easy one because of program components such as 
prayer and theism); Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 796-97 (explaining that by 
examining the 12-Step program, rather than deferring to the group’s own statement 
disclaiming any religious affiliation, one can find themes characteristic to most 
theistic religions); Calabro, supra note 13, at 596 (citing three reasons to consider 12-
Step programs fundamentally religious:  the history rooted in the religious Oxford 
Group Movement, the references to “God” in the central texts of 12-Step programs, 
and the incorporation of prayer into 12-Step events); Christopher K. Smith, Note, 
State Compelled Spiritual Revelation:  The First Amendment and Alcoholics Anonymous as a 
Condition of Drunk Driving Probation, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 299, 304 (1992) 
(suggesting that Alcoholics Anonymous’ claim to be “spiritual” but not “religious” is 
just a semantic distinction, not one that should withstand legal scrutiny).  While 
Alcoholics Anonymous chapters are fairly autonomous and may vary in religious 
content, they consistently require compulsory admission of powerlessness and 
submission to a higher being.  Id. at 304 n.44.  But see Byron K. Henry, Note, In “a 
Higher Power” We Trust:  Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Probation and 
Establishment of Religion, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 443, 471 (1997) (arguing that 
current constitutional definitions of religion are inadequate to determine whether 
12-Step programs are included). 
 77. See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text (finding that, while some courts 
decline to find 12-Step programs religious because of the flexibility inherent in the 
concept of a “higher Power,” others are unable to reconcile that finding with the 
programs’ religious content). 
 78. 766 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991). 
 79. Id. at 1017.  The prisoner claimed that mandated participation in Alcoholics 
Anonymous as part of a prison treatment program violated the First Amendment 
because it “improperly obligated him to abandon his own principles and adhere to 
the principles of Alcoholics Anonymous.”  Id. at 1016; see also Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-
CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *6 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993) (relying on the fact that 
the “God” or “Higher Power” of the program is as the prisoner understands, rather 
than a static image, and that he could substitute other words for “God,” to find the 
program not religious). 
 80. 526 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
 81. See id. at 899 (stating, without elaboration, that the primary function of the 
program was to confront alcoholism).  In this case, a driver whose privileges had 
been revoked because of a drunk driving conviction sued the state for requiring him 
to attend an alcoholism support group as a precondition to getting his license back.  
Id. at 895-98.  What is particularly striking about this case is that the court adopted 
several 12-Step premises, namely that an alcohol abuser must admit to being an 
alcoholic and receive life-long support.  Id. at 897.  While the petitioner  
demonstrated over two years of sobriety without attending any support program, the 
hearing officer found that he would always be at risk for a relapse and that merely 
discontinuing the use of alcohol did not meet the definition of sobriety according to 
Alcoholics Anonymous and others in the alcoholism field.  Id.  The court defined 
sobriety not as abstinence, but as a “way of thinking” or a “manner of living.”  Id. 
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The majority of courts find that 12-Step programs are 
constitutionally “religious.”82  In re Garcia83 is representative of the 
conclusions of these courts.84  Rather than relying on the 
organization’s assertion that the program is not religious, the court 
examined the history of Alcoholics Anonymous and its contemporary 
doctrine and practices.85  The court found that the required 12-Steps 
were “premised on the idea of a monotheistic God”86 and that 12-Step 
meetings are “permeated with religion.”87 
While the Youle court was correct that the primary 12-Step mission 
is not religious, this should be only one factor in the Establishment 
Clause analysis.88  Both the Youle and Stafford courts neglected to do a 
thorough analysis of the program at issue, coming to an abrupt 
conclusion based on Alcoholics Anonymous’ misleading self-
characterization of the 12-Step program.89  The Garcia court’s more 
thorough examination revealed doctrine and practices that include 
prayer and frequent reference to a monotheistic deity.90  That court 
appropriately judged these factors to be determinative on the issue of 
whether the programs were actually religious.91 
                                                 
 82. See Honeymar, Jr., supra note 15, at 445 (stating that most courts find 
Alcoholics Anonymous “religious” because it relies on theism and prayer); Ira Lupu 
& Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future:  Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of 
Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 985 (2003) (noting that courts 
consider 12-Step programs religious, while discussing the recent shift away from strict 
Separationism); see, e.g., DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, 247 F.3d 397, 407 
(2d Cir. 2001) (holding that an Alcoholics Anonymous program was a religion for 
Establishment Clause purposes); Rauser v. Horn, No. CIV.A.98-1538, 1999 WL 
33257806, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 
2001) (adopting Kerr’s conclusion that 12-Step programs are religious); Kerr v. 
Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479-80 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding Narcotics Anonymous to be 
religious because of the repeated references to God in the texts). 
 83. 24 P.3d 1091 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 84. See, e.g., Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 102-03 (N.Y. 1996) (concluding 
that, based on 12-Step doctrine and practices, Alcoholics Anonymous is religious); 
Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the county could not condition probation on attendance at a 12-Step 
program because of its religious content). 
 85. See Garcia, 24 P.3d at 1096 (discussing the religious background of Alcoholics 
Anonymous as well as the current practices that require a belief in a “Higher Power” 
and recitation of religious prayers). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  Alcoholics Anonymous participants in Garcia also recited the Lord’s 
Prayer and received coins inscribed with the Serenity Prayer.  Id. 
 88. See Honeymar, Jr., supra note 15, at 445 (emphasizing the presence of theism 
and prayer in the assessment of religious programs). 
 89. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing Youle and Stafford as 
examples of courts that look to the stated mission of programs rather than looking at 
the actual practices of programs). 
 90. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (citing courts that, in 
determining whether a program is “religious,” look to the actual practices of the 
program, rather than its stated mission). 
 91. See Smith, supra note 76, at 304 (noting that courts should investigate the 
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III. RELIGIOUS EXPOSURE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A. Introduction to Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
The Establishment Clause captures the principle of separation of 
church and state commanding that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion. . . .”92  Historically, the clause 
was not understood to forbid governmental expressions of support 
for religion, but rather to ensure that there was no compulsive state 
taxation in support of established churches.93  In modern times, 
however, the Supreme Court has moved towards restricting 
government expressions that communicate support for religious 
ideas.94  When challenging mandated 12-Step participation, a 
conclusion that 12-Step programs are religious does not alone 
compel a further conclusion that the Establishment Clause has been 
violated.  Rather, courts make that determination by applying one of 
several tests that have emerged in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.95  The two tests currently used most often in 
determining an unconstitutional establishment of religion are the 
“Coercion Test” and the “Endorsement Test.”96 
                                                 
actual activities of a group, rather than rely on the group’s stated purpose). 
 92. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Education 
clearly stated that the Establishment Clause is “made applicable to the states” 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  330 U.S. 1, 5 (1947); see also School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230-55 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing 
historical and logical support for the incorporation of the Establishment Clause into 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 93. See Ira C. Lupu, Government Message and Government Money:  Santa Fe, Mitchell 
v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 776-77 
(2001) (noting that, in the primarily Protestant Christian early America, theistic 
government pronouncements were common, but they did not draw the same 
reaction as did coercive taxation used to support the Church). 
 94. See generally id. (tracing both the change in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence away from a strict monetary separation of church and state and 
towards a restriction on government speech that could be viewed as promotion of 
religion and the change in American religious history from a primarily Protestant 
nation to a religiously pluralistic society). 
 95. See generally Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 797-804 (tracing the process of 
Establishment Clause determination under several tests, including the “Coercion 
Test” and the “Endorsement Test”). 
 96. See Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test:  Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & 
POL. 499, 504-08 (2002) (characterizing the Coercion Test and the Endorsement 
Test as the two prime candidates to officially oust the Court’s three-prong test in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).  The Lemon test, which was initially 
articulated in a case about state financial assistance to religious schools, requires that 
a statute have a secular legislative purpose, that its primary effect is neutral as to 
religion, and that it does not foster “an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”  403 U.S. at 612-13.  While the Lemon test reigned supreme for decades, in 
recent years it has been discredited, if not overruled.  See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(comparing the Lemon test to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that 
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In deciding cases dealing with mandated 12-Step participation in 
prison or probation contexts, courts have generally relied on the 
Coercion Test.97  Using this test, the courts find Establishment Clause 
violations if a prisoner or probationer is coerced to participate in the 
program.98  However, because of the idiosyncrasies of the drug court 
setting, such as the choice to enter the alternative docket,99 it is 
difficult to conclude that a participant has been coerced into 
religious observance.100  The Endorsement Test is more appropriate 
for the drug court context because it looks at the overall results of 
government promotion of the program instead of relying on the 
program’s details.101  Rather than focusing on whether the state 
compelled a particular individual to participate in a religious 
exercise, this test questions the public statement made by such 
government interaction with religion.102  If the government action 
appears to endorse the religious message, then it violates the 
Establishment Clause.103 
                                                 
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 
794 (2000) (recalling that, in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), the Court recast 
the entanglement inquiry to represent just one criterion in the effect inquiry). The 
Mitchell Court went on to decide the case on the basis of neutrality and secular 
content, virtually ignoring the Lemon test altogether.  Id.  Although the Court has 
never formally overruled the Lemon test, scholars assume it is essentially defunct.  See, 
e.g., Choper, supra note 96, at 499 (declaring that the Court has abandoned the 
Lemon test in favor of the endorsement test).  The two most prominent tests, 
Coercion and Endorsement, are theoretically distinct, but the current state of flux of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has lead to decisions that seem to combine the 
two.  See, e.g., Kerr v. Farey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (using the Coercion Test 
for the ultimate finding, but including language that condemns a prison for favoring 
religion over non-religion, an Endorsement Test matter). 
 97. See infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text (finding that, where prison or 
probation officials use coercion to encourage 12-Step program attendance, courts 
will declare the practice unconstitutional and in violation of the Establishment 
Clause). 
 98. See infra notes 127-42 and accompanying text (discussing the court treatment 
of 12-Step programs in correctional contexts). 
 99. See Terry, III, supra note 37, at 4-5 (describing some differences between 
traditional courts and drug courts, focusing particularly on drug court procedures 
that accelerate the intervention). 
 100. See infra notes 143-94 and accompanying text (arguing that the Coercion Test 
is inappropriate in the drug court context). 
 101. See infra notes 192-220 and accompanying text (exploring the strengths of the 
Endorsement Test, as applied to drug courts). 
 102. See Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 789 (suggesting that the Coercion Test 
improperly ignores the principle of separation of church and state, which is a focus 
of the Endorsement Test). 
 103. See infra notes 192-220 and accompanying text (providing background for the 
adoption of the Endorsement Test and discussing several of its recent applications). 
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B. Coerced Participation in Religious Practice 
1.  Fundamentals of the Coercion Test 
The first test, the Coercion Test, finds a violation of the 
Establishment Clause if a state actor forces an individual to 
participate in or observe religious practices.104  The central debate of 
the test involves a determination of what constitutes coercion.105  In 
Lee v. Weisman106 the Supreme Court majority held that including 
prayer in a public middle school graduation forced students to 
participate in a religious activity.107  Despite the objections of 
fourteen-year-old Deborah Weisman and her father, the school 
principal invited a rabbi to offer prayers at the opening of the 
graduation ceremony for Weisman’s class.108  The Court’s majority 
noted the social importance of a school graduation ceremony, and 
suggested that the choice to abstain from prayer was not a fair choice 
for a graduating student.109  According to the decision, this kind of 
social pressure to support or participate in a religious act amounts to 
an act of government coercion.110  “It is beyond dispute,” the Court 
concluded, that “at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that the 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise.”111  Further, the Court found the school 
graduation prayers to be state-compelled religious conformity.112 
The Court, however, acknowledged that the young age of the 
students exposed to the school-sponsored prayer influenced the 
decision, because of the students’ vulnerability to peer pressure.113  
                                                 
  104.  See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (holding that a voluntary 
class in religion was constitutional, but if teachers coerced students to take the class, 
then the Establishment Clause would be violated).  But see Allegheny County v. Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 628 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(cautioning that “[t]his Court has never relied on coercion alone as the touchstone 
of Establishment Clause analysis”). 
 105. See Calabro, supra note 13, at 580 (exploring two versions of the Coercion 
Test that have emerged from the Supreme Court, a broad psychological Coercion 
Test and a more demanding legal Coercion Test). 
 106. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 107. Id. at 587, 596. 
 108. Id. at 584.  The students were expected to stand as a group during the 
prayers, or at least keep respectfully silent.  Id. at 593. 
 109. See id. at 594 (finding that the public prayers would exert terrific peer 
pressure on the student to conform, especially in a school setting where the risk of 
compulsion is especially high). 
 110. See id. at 586 (noting that, even though the school district did not require 
attendance at the ceremony as a condition of graduation, the participation was “in a 
fair and real sense obligatory”). 
 111. Id. at 587. 
 112. Id. at 599. 
 113. See id. at 593 (considering psychology research that found teenagers to be 
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The Court did not indicate that the conclusion would necessarily 
differ if the case involved adults rather than teenagers.114  However, it 
made clear that youth—and the presumption of susceptibility to 
psychological coercion that accompanies it—were factors in 
determining whether the government acted coercively.115 
Writing the dissent in this case, Justice Scalia took a more straight-
forward approach to coercion, asserting that the majority’s 
“psychological coercion” test was unworkable and “boundlessly 
manipulable.”116  He noted that students at the graduation ceremony 
had the choice to sit during the prayers rather than stand and 
participate.117  He explained that the “coercion that was the hallmark 
of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious 
orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of 
penalty.”118  Students who chose to abstain from the religious 
observance of prayer faced no actual penalties.119  By this definition, 
then, the school did not coerce the students to take part in a religious 
exercise.120 
A more recent case indicates that the dissenting view in Lee 
currently represents the more prominent approach to the Coercion 
Test.  Specifically, the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris121 reviewed a 
school voucher program in which low-income parents could choose 
to send their children to neighboring school districts, private 
religious schools, private non-religious schools, or get tutoring for 
children who remained enrolled in the local public school.122  Where 
the voucher money was spent was highly dependent on where the 
parents chose to enroll their children.123  The majority relied heavily 
on the notion of private choice, and ruled that the school voucher 
                                                 
especially susceptible to pressure to conform to social conventions). 
 114. See id. (explaining that the application of the decision to adults was not 
addressed by the Court). 
 115. Id.; see also Choper, supra note 96, at 504 (suggesting that the majority 
definition of coercion, which includes indirect and subtle pressures, is broader than 
the common understanding of the term). 
 116. Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 117. See id. at 637 (explaining that there was nothing physically compelling the 
students to stand or participate, and no indication that student dissents were 
dissuaded in any way). 
 118. Id. at 640. 
 119. Id. at 637.  Justice Scalia further notes that a student’s mere respectful silence 
during a prayer need not be considered assent nor participation.  Id. 
 120. See id. at 642 (agreeing with the notion that the government cannot force 
individuals to participate in religion, but finding that exposure to a school prayer did 
not amount to coercion); see also id. at 609 (Souter, J., concurring) (considering the 
disputed school practice to raise an issue of endorsement, rather than coercion). 
 121. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 122. Id. at 645-46. 
 123. Id. at 646. 
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program was constitutional because parents maintained the choice to 
determine whether to send their children to religious schools.124  A 
dissenting opinion, written by Justice Souter, however, suggests that 
the parents’ decisions were based on limited educational options, 
rather than religious preference and genuine choice.125  The majority 
dismissed this hypothesis, and concluded that coercion did not exist 
if the state did not force parents to send their children to a religious 
school or only offered religious schools as a choice.126  Thus, a 
straightforward definition of coercion seems to currently reign on the 
Court. 
2. 12-Step programs and coercion 
A number of lower courts have addressed the issue of mandated 
participation in Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous.  
Generally, challenges to the constitutionality of the mandated 
programs rest on Establishment Clause grounds,127 and nearly all of 
the cases apply the Coercion Test.128  The Seventh Circuit opinion in 
Kerr v. Farrey129 provides the clearest statement of the Coercion Test as 
applied to mandated participation in a 12-Step program.130  Prison 
authorities required Kerr to attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings 
during his period of incarceration.131  If Kerr refused, the authorities 
                                                 
 124. Id. at 662-63. 
 125. See id. at 698 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that it was obvious that limited 
educational options influenced parents rather than religious preference because 
nearly two out of three families using vouchers to send their children to religious 
schools did not agree with the religion taught there). 
 126. See id. at 640 (emphasizing that the choice offered to parents remedies any 
coercion that could otherwise be present). 
 127. See infra notes 128-142 and accompanying text (discussing cases challenging 
mandated participation in 12-Step programs).  The one exception in the framing of 
the challenges is Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991), in which the 
plaintiff challenged mandatory participation in the prison 12-Step program on Free 
Exercise Clause grounds rather than Establishment Clause grounds.  His specific 
contention was that the program required him to abandon his personal religious 
beliefs and to replace them with the principles of the 12-Step program.  Id. at 1016.  
Because the court ruled that the program was not religious, it did not consider the 
intricacies of the Free Exercise argument.  Id. at 1017. 
 128. See, e.g., Rauser v. Horn, No. CIV.A. 98-1538, 1999 WL 33257806, at **4-7 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1999) rev’d on other grounds, 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(considering the coercion involved with conditioning parole on 12-Step attendance); 
Arnold v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 484 (Tenn. 1997) (finding coercion 
in a parole condition, but remanding to determine if the mandated program was 
religious); United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 780 (8th Cir. 1999) (ruling that 
coercion could not be considered until a specific treatment plan was developed for 
the individual on probation). 
 129. 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 130. See Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 828 (describing the court’s influential 
analysis of the alleged coercive conditions). 
 131. Kerr, 95 F.3d at 474. 
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would classify him as a higher security risk, a label that would have 
had negative consequences on parole eligibility.132  In applying the 
Coercion Test, the Kerr court concluded that requiring attendance at 
12-Step meetings constituted coercion.133  Although the prisoner 
technically had a choice of whether to attend, the consequence of a 
negative decision would be a longer period of incarceration, and thus 
it was not a meaningful choice.134 
In addition to declaring the prison practice unconstitutional, the 
Seventh Circuit suggested a remedy.  The opinion did not forbid 
religious-based rehabilitation programs at the prison.135  Instead, it 
ruled that the prison needed only offer a non-religious program as an 
alternative.136  This alternative would provide Kerr and other 
prisoners with a meaningful choice, thus defeating state coercion.137 
Following the Kerr decision, the District Court for Eastern 
Wisconsin addressed the related question of whether criminal justice 
authorities could avoid the coercion issue by having an alternative, 
non-religious program made available at the petitioner’s request.138  
The court found that a parolee was coerced to enter a religiously-
oriented residential treatment facility as an alternative to returning to 
prison for parole violations.139  His parole officer contended that his 
                                                 
 132. Id.  Mr. Kerr brought suit claiming that he was required to participate in a 
substance abuse program with overt religious content while in prison.  Id.  If he did 
not participate, he would suffer adverse effects for parole eligibility. Id.  The only 
program offered was Narcotics Anonymous, to which the prisoner objected, because 
he did not want to drag “God’s name into ‘this messy business of addictions’ and he 
expressed his disagreement with the view of God that was proposed at the meeting.”  
Id. 
 133. Id. at 479.  The court concluded that the threat of adverse consequences for 
refusing to attend amounted to coercive pressure to participate in a religious activity.  
Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 470 (finding that the Establishment Clause was violated if the prison 
only offered Narcotics Anonymous, or other religious based programs, without also 
providing a secular alternative). 
 136. Id. (finding that case law supported the same conclusion that the 
Establishment Clause does not allow the state to discriminate against atheistic or 
agnostic inmates if they refuse to attend and participate in religious-based substance 
abuse programs). 
 137. Id.; accord Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 640 (2002); see also Rauser 
v. Horn, No. CIV.A. 98-1538, 1999 WL 33257806, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1999), rev’d 
on other grounds, 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001) (following the Kerr court and deciding 
that participation in a religious-based rehabilitation program cannot be a parole 
condition); Arnold v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 484 (focusing on choices 
offered to a prisoner in its consideration of whether the prisoner was coerced into 
attending a specific treatment program); United States v. Behler, 187 F.3d 772, 780 
(holding that Behler did not have a First Amendment claim based on his condition 
for supervised release mandating that he undergo treatment as directed by his 
probation officer because no treatment protocol had yet been established). 
 138. Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2001). 
 139. Id. at 1037.  After the plaintiff was caught committing a parole violation, his 
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attendance was not coerced, because she would have provided him 
with secular alternatives if he had so requested.140  Regardless, the 
court found that the choice presented to the petitioner, namely 
prison or a rehabilitation program with religious components, was 
“inherently coercive.”141  According to the court, the state is required 
to provide a meaningful choice of whether to enter a religious 
program, rather than rely on an individual to request such a choice.142 
3. Applying the Coercion Test to the drug court setting 
a. The consequences for drug court failure are not as coercive as the 
consequences for probationers or prisoners 
There is no case law on mandated 12-Step participation as part of a 
drug court treatment protocol; however, the practice would likely 
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny under the Coercion Test as it 
has developed.  Under the broader psychological Coercion Test of 
Lee, the public order of a judge might be considered coercive.143  
However, the Supreme Court in Zelman144 and lower courts addressing 
12-Step mandates have opted for the stricter version of the Coercion 
Test in which the consequences of refusing to comply and the 
individual choices offered must be examined.145  At first glance, the 
                                                 
parole officer advised him that he could avoid returning to prison by entering a 
specific residential substance abuse treatment program.  Id. at 1029.  The parole 
officer did not suggest any alternative programs.  Id. 
 140. Id. at 1035. 
 141. Id. at 1036.  But see In re Garcia, 24 P.3d 1091, 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) 
(arriving at a different conclusion based on similar facts).  In a prison program 
discussed in Garcia, an inmate was enrolled in either Narcotics Anonymous or 
Alcoholics Anonymous sessions upon entering a chemical dependency treatment 
program.  Id. at 1091. The program did allow, however, for each individual to make 
alternate arrangements.  Id. at 1096.  Though it appears that a prisoner would have 
to act affirmatively to preserve his or her constitutional rights, the court found that 
the existence of a non-religious program as an alternative meant that a prisoner was 
not coerced, so there was no First Amendment violation.  Id. at 1096-97. 
 142. See Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1035 (providing the eloquent summary 
statement that “it is the government’s obligation always to comply with the 
Constitution, rather than to do so only upon request”); see also Apanovitch, supra 
note 11, at 850 (suggesting that few would be brave enough to assert their rights 
while under criminal justice supervision, and thus, most individuals would assume 
they have no choice other than compliance). 
 143. Compare Philip Bean, Drug Courts, the Judge, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in DRUG 
COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 235, 238-39 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002) 
(describing the legal and personal influence most drug court judges have over the 
participants), with Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992) (concluding that the 
subtle pressure to conform that resulted from a public prayer was constitutionally 
coercive). 
 144. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 145. See supra notes 121-142 and accompanying text (looking at both school 
voucher systems and mandatory prison substance abuse programs, the courts have 
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situation of a drug court judge assigning a 12-Step program to a 
defendant does not seem to differ from a traditional judge 
mandating 12-Step participation as a condition of probation.  Yet, the 
choice a defendant has of whether to enter the drug court, as well as 
the kinds of consequences that exist for failure, make the drug court 
context quite different.146  As such, challenges based on the Coercion 
Test are likely to fail.147 
Unlike traditional court settings, defendants make the choice of 
whether to enter the drug court docket.148  While the consequence 
awaiting a probationer or prisoner who refuses to attend a mandatory 
12-Step program is immediate or lengthened imprisonment,149 an 
arrestee refusing the opportunity to enter drug court will receive 
nothing worse than the traditional court process.150  The choice 
offered to the defendant is between the traditional court procedure 
and an alternative venue. 
While undergoing criminal court proceedings may be unpleasant, 
it can hardly be characterized as a coercive consequence on par with 
definite incarceration.  The traditional adversarial trial includes well-
tested procedural protections, as well as the chance that the judge or 
jury will return a not-guilty verdict.151  Drug courts, on the other hand, 
                                                 
found it important that individuals are given options and that, beyond not having to 
participate in religious-based programs, a refusal does not have negative 
consequences). 
 146. See Terry, III, supra note 37, at 1-9 (comparing features of traditional courts 
with drug courts, such as the procedure by which one enters each court docket; the 
respective roles of attorneys, judges, and defendants; and the results of failing to 
heed the stated requirements). 
 147. Compare Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (finding 
coercion based on the adverse consequence of imprisonment for refusing the 
probation mandate), with NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 41 (explaining that the 
consequences of drug court program failure is not immediate imprisonment but a 
trial in the traditional court system). 
 148. See Sara Steen, West Coast Drug Courts:  Getting Offenders Morally Involved in the 
Criminal Justice Process, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 51, 61 (James L. 
Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002) (explaining that the option offered to arrestees of whether to 
enter the drug court not only fulfills the practical purpose of assigning defendants to 
dockets, but also serves the therapeutic goal of empowering substance abusers to 
make the decision to actively pursue rehabilitation). 
 149. See, e.g., Bausch, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 (reporting that the petitioner would 
have gone to prison if he had refused to enter the religious program); Kerr v. Farrey, 
95 F.3d 472, 474 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the prisoner had a worse chance of 
gaining parole as a result of refusing to attend the 12-Step meetings in prison). 
 150. See William D. McColl, Theory and Practice in the Baltimore City Drug Treatment 
Court, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 3, 8 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002) 
(describing the free choice an arrestee has between entering the drug court program 
or continuing on the traditional criminal justice path). 
 151. See generally STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE:  CASES AND COMMENTARY 997-1307 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing the due 
process rights afforded to each criminal defendant in the traditional court system). 
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have the controversial feature of defense counsel participation in the 
drug court “team.”152  Additionally, all participants in drug courts are 
treated as if they were guilty.153  While the major benefit of the drug 
court seems to be the chance to get a sentence other than 
incarceration, this option actually exists in both dockets.  Drug courts 
do not change the existing sentencing structures.154  Rather, judges in 
traditional courts can also avoid mandatory minimum sentences by 
imposing deferred sentences or probation, and they can also 
mandate addiction treatment.155  Additionally, for drug court 
participants, there is a distinct possibility that the mandated 
treatment will take longer than any jail sentence they could receive 
for their alleged crimes.156  While entry into many drug courts 
inevitably leads to mandated 12-Step participation, there does not 
seem to be any coercion to enter the alternative docket, because 
there is a meaningful choice between two dockets.157 
There is another point in the drug court process, however, that 
opens the door to analysis under the Coercion Test.  When the judge 
provides the individual with the components of the treatment 
program she or he must follow to remain in good standing with the 
drug court, the individual is faced with a potentially coercive 
                                                 
 152. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1246 (1998) (examining the conflicting goals of 
the traditional adversarial system and the therapeutic-oriented drug court system 
along with the risks defendants encounter when defense attorneys abandon their 
adversarial role and enter into a rehabilitative team); Morris B. Hoffman, The Denver 
Drug Court and its Unintended Consequences, in DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND IN 
PRACTICE 67, 80 (James L. Nolan, Jr. ed., 2002) (exclaiming that “the bedrock 
protections inherent in the adversary nature of our criminal justice system and the 
independence of the judiciary are put seriously at risk” by the collaborative team 
structure of drug courts). 
 153. See generally Bing-Newton, supra note 30, at 1881 (lamenting the assumption 
of guilt that most people accused of drug crimes experience). 
 154. See Hoffman, supra note 152, at 79-80 (explaining that without separate 
legislation, drug courts are still bound by the same sentencing rules that guide 
traditional courts). 
 155. Id.  This is not to suggest that drug courts are not innovative or that they fail 
to do more to promote rehabilitation than traditional courts.  Terry, III, supra note 
37, at 7.  Rather, this point is made to emphasize the fact that the consequence of 
choosing traditional court is not comparable to the consequence of definite 
incarceration in the probation or prison contexts.  See supra notes 121-42 and 
accompanying text. 
 156. See Goldkamp, supra note 18, at 22-23 (explaining that the minimum twelve 
months of intensive treatment and significant judicial involvement is often seen as 
more demanding than the few months in jail or on probation that an individual 
would otherwise receive for their crime). 
 157. See, e.g., McColl, supra note 150, at 8 (explaining the detailed process judges 
go through to allow participants to make an informed choice between traditional 
court and drug court). 
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decision.158  Though the atmosphere in most drug courts seems far 
less coercive than in a traditional court,159 it is important to remember 
that judges still have the power of the criminal justice system behind 
them.160 
Even at this point, however, the determination of coercion for 
Establishment Clause purposes is less clear cut than in the probation 
and prison cases.  While the consequences of refusing a mandate to 
go to 12-Step meetings in the probation and prison cases was actual 
incarceration, the ultimate sanction in drug court is failing out and 
returning to the traditional court system.161  Immediate incarceration 
is only a threat for a drug court participant as an intermediate 
sanction through which a judge may impose a brief jail stay to scare 
the defendant into treatment compliance.162  Though brief, it is an 
actual deprivation of liberty and may be considered coercion when 
viewed with a bright-line test that considers any consequence of 
incarceration to constitute coercion.163  This creates an odd situation, 
however, in which an intermediate sanction is considered to be more 
coercive than the ultimate drug court sanction—getting kicked out.164  
The better test for determining an Establishment Clause violation in 
the drug court context is Endorsement, because it focuses on the 
overall implications of government interaction with religion, rather 
than the details of specific choices and consequences.165  
                                                 
 158. See Steen, supra note 148, at 52 (explaining that treatment decisions are made 
at various points during the drug court, which may have input from the defendant, 
but are actually imposed by the judge). 
 159. See Bean, supra note 143, at 236-37 (describing drug court  status hearings in 
which the judge inquires casually about a defendant’s progress in the treatment 
programs and appears to be on the defendant’s side); see also Steen, supra note 148, 
at 60 (describing the incorporation of the defendant into the decision-making 
process, in part to characterize the decision to abstain as a personal choice, rather 
than one prompted by the court).  But see id. at 59 (relating a prosecutor’s statement 
that most real decisions are made outside of the courtroom, and away from the 
defendant, so that the “team” can present a united front). 
 160. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 50-52 (arguing that it is a mistake to consider 
drug courts to be “soft on crime” because the therapeutic approach is not necessarily 
easier on defendants, even though it is more likely to achieve positive results). 
 161. See Hennessy, supra note 45, at 7 (listing as intermediate sanctions community 
service, extra treatment requirements, additional time observing the drug court, and 
being sent back to the regular court system as the ultimate sanction). 
 162. See Steen, supra note 148, at 62 (describing the judge’s decision to impose a 
short jail stay as a “tough love” approach to convince the participant to focus on their 
rehabilitation goals). 
 163. See supra notes 127-42 and accompanying text (describing cases that focused 
on the consequences of failure to comply in the probation and prison contexts). 
 164. See Wolf, supra note 47, at 42 (showing the drug court team’s hesitation to 
give up on a participant and fail him out of the drug court). 
 165. See infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text (describing how religious 
endorsement is a violation of the Establishment Clause). 
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b. Lesser protection for adults 
As described above, age has been an influential factor in the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of coercion.166  In Lee, the Court admitted 
that the school setting and the students’ youthful susceptibility to 
coercion had some impact on its decision.167  The Court even 
suggested that the result might be different if adults rather than 
adolescents were being pressured to participate in religious 
exercises.168 
An opinion by the federal district court in southern Iowa on a 
program in the prison setting similarly explored the vulnerability of 
the defendant, and implied there was a higher standard for adults 
than minors.169  In Jones v. Smid, the prisoner objected to a treatment 
program that was based on Alcoholics Anonymous principles.170  The 
court denied that the program was “religious” by constitutional 
standards, and thus denied him relief.171  The fact that he was an 
adult, however, clearly influenced the result.  The court stated that as 
an adult, he should understand that his participation in a religious 
activity would not necessarily signify “his own participation in, or 
approval of, a religious practice.”172  The premise, evidenced by this 
decision, is that prisons can pressure adults to participate in activities 
that may be morally offensive to them, like prayer and religious 
recitation.173 
Fortunately, other cases examining mandated 12-Step participation 
did not follow suit.174  These court opinions focused on the choices 
made available to prisoners and probationers, rather than the 
likelihood that a particular individual would feel compelled to 
                                                 
 166. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text. 
 167. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992). 
 168. See id. (noting psychological research supporting the “common assumption” 
that children are susceptible to strong peer pressure to conform).  To illustrate how 
adults are less susceptible to this type of pressure, the Court distinguished the school 
setting from a prayer at the opening session of a state legislature, where adults are 
free to enter and exit freely.  Id. at 596-97. 
 169. Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20857, 1993 WL 719562, at *4 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 
1993). 
 170. See id. at **1-2 (detailing the prisoner’s experience, in which he attended 12-
Step meetings as a condition of probation, but objected to a recitation of a promise 
that included a recognition of God). 
 171. See id. at **4-5 (concluding that because Jones had the chance to substitute 
different words for “God,” the program was not religious). 
 172. Id. at *5. 
 173. Id. (noting that the program and promise were not unconstitutional despite 
the fact that they were offensive to Jones). 
 174. See, e.g., Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996) (failing to consider the 
age of the prisoner in the context of coercion); Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F. Supp. 2d 
1029, 1033-34 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (focusing on the nature of the choice articulated to 
the probationer, rather than any personal factors, to determine coercion). 
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conform.175  Similarly, it is unlikely that age or susceptibility to 
compulsion would be factors considered by drug courts, because of 
the legal trend away from the psychological definition of coercion 
promoted in Lee.176 
c. Waiver of objection 
Arguably, persons electing to enter drug court programs waive 
their rights to be free from pressure to engage in religious activities.177  
In electing to join the alternate docket, they have clearly indicated an 
interest in avoiding the traditional consequences of criminal trial.178  
This choice, however, can hardly be equated with a conscious 
decision to adopt religious views or even embark on a lifestyle 
change.179  Further, it is not reasonable to expect the arrested 
individual to predict that the state would choose a religious-oriented 
support group as part of the treatment mandated.180 
This position is supported by the analysis in a Second Circuit case, 
Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob.,181 which dealt with Alcoholics 
Anonymous attendance as a probation condition.  The defendant 
attended a few meetings before sentencing and did not object at 
sentencing when the judge included a mandate to continue 
attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.182  When the defendant 
later complained, the government argued that forcing him to go to 
Alcoholics Anonymous did not violate the Establishment Clause, and 
the dissent contended that he had waived any Establishment Clause 
                                                 
 175. Id.; see also Calabro, supra note 13, at 579-81 (contrasting the psychological 
Coercion Test put forth in Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), which considered some 
characteristics of the victims, with the more direct legal Coercion Test promoted by 
the Court that dealt only with the objective factors of choices offered). 
 176. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text (discussing Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), where the Supreme Court upheld a school-voucher 
program based on parent choice with an argument analogous to Scalia’s dissent in 
Lee, which rejected the psychological Coercion Test); see also infra notes 252-55 and 
accompanying text (exploring policy reasons for avoiding the imposition of a set of 
offensive beliefs onto someone as a part of rehabilitation). 
 177. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange County Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1078 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (Winter, J., dissenting) (arguing that a defendant who accepted a 
sentence of mandatory 12-Step participation without complaining or appealing 
waived his rights to later object to the religiousness of the program). 
 178. See Steen, supra note 148, at 51-52 (expounding on the importance of the 
choice to enter drug courts, rather than choosing the traditional path of criminal 
justice). 
 179. See id. at 63 (describing the initial choice to enter the drug court for many 
people as “calculative involvement,” in which they make their decision based on a 
desire to have their charges dismissed instead of a desire for treatment). 
 180. See generally id. (suggesting that most offenders have little understanding of 
the drug court requirements when first exposed to the program). 
 181. 115 F.3d 1068 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 182. Id. at 1073. 
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objection.183  However, the majority found that a few meetings were 
not enough for him to realize the full religious content of the 
program.184  The court continued with a finding that the defendant’s 
attendance before sentencing could not be relied on as an 
unambiguous statement of assent to waive his rights, because his 
knowledge and understanding of the program were incomplete.185 
Most drug court participants will likewise be uninformed when they 
opt into the alternate docket.  Different drug courts have various 
strategies for informing prospective participants about what their 
treatment regimen will entail.  For example, in the Baltimore City 
Drug Treatment Court the program starts with the public defender 
and the prosecutor agreeing on a plan for the defendant, which is 
later memorialized in a contract outlining the program and possible 
sanctions for violations.186  The defendant will enter the drug court 
after signing the contract, where the judge will give the defendant 
one last chance to reconsider.187  Under these circumstances, the 
defendant will understand what treatment protocol is required.  
Ambiguity still exists, however, about whether the defendant 
recognizes the religious nature of any mandated 12-Step 
participation.188 
The process in other drug courts, however, can be even less 
ambiguous.  In two west coast drug courts, for example, prospective 
participants actually go through a two-week introductory period that 
includes tasks such as 12-Step attendance.189  The individual officially 
opts into the drug court only after completing the two weeks.190  In 
this situation, it is difficult to suggest that the defendant did not know 
what the treatment protocol required.  Following the guidance of the 
Warner court, however, it is arguable that even in this situation, the 
defendant could not knowingly and voluntarily waive his or her 
rights.  In Warner, the court found that the evidence did not show 
                                                 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.  The court mentions that the religiosity of the program intensified after 
the defendant had attended for some time, because when he was found to be 
unengaged and lacking zeal, his probation officer required him to attend more 
meetings, despite his complaints about the religious content.  Id. at 1073-74. 
 185. Id. at 1074.  By his own admission, Warner only attended meetings before 
sentencing to convince the judge he was already getting his problem under control.  
Id. at 1074, 1078. 
 186. McColl, supra note 150, at 8. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (describing the drug court components that will be explained to a 
potential participant, such as treatment requirements and sanctions, but not 
indicating that the specific programs will be described at any great length). 
 189. Steen, supra note 148, at 61. 
 190. Id. 
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that Warner’s attendance at a few Alcoholics Anonymous sessions 
prior to sentence gave him sufficient awareness of the nature or 
extent of the religious exercises to justify either imputing consent or 
charging him with forfeiture.191  While the spiritual nature of the 
program was apparent to Warner immediately, it was not until well 
after beginning his sentence that Warner recognized the depth of the 
program’s religious contents.192  Similarly, a two-week introduction to 
the drug court program and 12-Step meetings would give a criminal 
defendant a sense of the program, but it would not be enough to 
convey the full extent of the religious requirement.193  More than just 
a brief attendance is necessary to impute a knowing and voluntary 
waiver, and thus the waiver doctrine does not repair the flaws of the 
Coercion Test when applied in the drug court context.194 
C. Court “Endorsement” of Religious Programs 
1. Emergence of the Endorsement Test 
The Endorsement Test is applied less frequently to questions of 
mandated 12-Step participation than the Coercion Test,195 but it is the 
better test with which to evaluate religious program components in 
drug courts because it does not require an examination of the 
penalty for failing out of drug court and the coercive power of that 
consequence.196  Rather the Endorsement Test condemns any 
government action that promotes or endorses one religion over 
another, or religion over non-religion.197 
                                                 
 191. 115 F.3d at 1073-74. 
 192. Id. at 1073. 
 193. See Steen, supra note 148, at 63-65 (describing the typical progression of 
involvement with drug court programs as starting with an impersonal calculation 
based on avoiding incarceration or clearing their records and moving to moral 
involvement and engagement with treatment components). 
 194. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text (discussing Warner, 115 F.3d at 
1073-74, where the court decided that attending Alcoholics Anonymous for a few 
meetings is not long enough for a defendant to understand the full religious content 
of the program and therefore could not knowingly waive the right to object to the 
program). 
 195. See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text (noting only one case where the 
court applied the Endorsement Test to a question of mandated 12-Step participation 
in the prison context). 
 196. See Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 837 (positing that the Coercion Test is 
popular in the criminal context because it is an easier site-specific analysis for the 
penal system, but suggesting that the Endorsement Test is more appropriate because 
it emphasizes the constitutional issue of separation of church and state). 
 197. See generally Choper, supra note 96, at 508 (examining the Endorsement Test 
and suggesting that it has gained favor among the Supreme Court justices, five of 
whom have embraced it in various opinions). 
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Justice O’Connor first articulated the test in her Lynch v. Donnelly 
concurrence.198  Justice O’Connor expressed concern with the 
message of exclusion sent by the government when it supported a 
particular religion.199  The Lynch case involved a government-
sponsored winter holiday display that included a Christian nativity 
scene in a local park.200  Justice O’Connor examined both what the 
city intended to communicate with the display, and the likely effect 
on the viewers, concluding that the Establishment Clause would be 
violated if either the government intended to endorse religion, or if 
the government expression had the effect of conveying a message of 
endorsement.201  Using this test, Justice O’Connor concluded that the 
holiday setting—which included primarily traditionally secular 
holiday symbols202—suggested not endorsement of a religious 
message, but a mere acknowledgement of the public holiday.203  Thus, 
she agreed with the Court that the display was best understood as a 
traditional celebration of a public holiday rather than a religious 
endorsement.204 
Subsequently, the Court’s majority adopted the Endorsement Test 
in Allegheny County v. ACLU,205 when the Court noted that in the 
preceding years it had increased its scrutiny of the question of 
“whether the challenged governmental practice either has the 
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.”206  This case also involved 
public displays of winter holiday symbols; however, there were two 
different displays involved, which the Court chose to evaluate 
separately.207  The first display was an elaborate Christian nativity 
                                                 
 198. 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In this articulation, 
Justice O’Connor proposed an endorsement inquiry as a clarification of the Lemon 
Test.  Id. at 688-89; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  Since then, 
however, it has evolved into an independent test.  See Allegheny County v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 594-95 (1989) (using the Endorsement Test without 
any reliance on Lemon). 
 199. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (describing two situations that make a person’s 
religion relevant to their political standing:  government alignment with a specific 
religion, even if informal; and outright endorsement or disapproval). 
 200. Id. at 671. 
 201. Id. at 690. 
 202. See id. at 671 (listing other elements of the display, including a Santa Clause 
house, reindeer pulling a sleigh, candy-striped poles, and a banner reading “Seasons 
Greetings”). 
 203. Id. at 692. 
 204. Id. at 691.  See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 
2323 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying her belief that instances of 
“ceremonial deism” such as the national motto—In God We Trust—, religious 
references in patriotic songs, and the words “Under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, do not amount to government endorsement of religion). 
 205. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 206. Id. at 592. 
 207. Id. at 581-82. 
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scene located by the “Grand Staircase” of the county courthouse.208  
The second display was a Chanukah menorah, along with a Christmas 
tree and a sign saluting liberty, in the City-County municipal 
building.209  Applying Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test, the 
Court found that the first display’s grandeur and location in a central 
government building amounted to endorsement.210  They did not 
find, however, that the second display violated the Establishment 
Clause, because the combination of religious and secular symbols 
communicated recognition of the winter-holiday season, rather than 
a preference for any religion, or for religion over non-religion.211 
In reaching these fact-specific conclusions, the Court examined the 
concept of government endorsement.212  Seeking to elucidate the 
principle, the Court stated that the Establishment Clause “prohibits 
government from appearing to take a position on questions of 
religious belief” or from creating a situation in which a person’s 
religious beliefs are relevant to their standing in the political 
community.213  Because the first display communicated support for 
Christianity, it violated the Establishment Clause, while the second 
display did not send a similar message of government preference 
because of its particular characteristics.214 
The most recent Supreme Court expression of the Endorsement 
Test is in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe.215  In this case, the Court 
determined whether a student-led prayer delivered over the public 
address system before public high school football games amounted to 
endorsement.216  The Court easily concluded that the speech in 
                                                 
 208. Id. at 578. 
 209. Id. at 587. 
 210. Id. at 599-600. 
 211. Id. at 616. 
 212. Id. at 592-93 (listing prior cases where the Court either invalidated statutes 
and programs because they constituted government endorsement of religion, or 
where it explored the definition of the term); see, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 
489 U.S. 1 (1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Sch. Dist. of Grand 
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Epperson v. Arkansas, 
393 U.S. 97 (1968); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1963); Abington Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (exploring the definition 
of “endorsement”). 
 213. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594. 
 214. Id. at 621. 
 215. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).  This case also provides a good example of the way the 
Coercion and Endorsement Tests can overlap because the case relies on Lee as its 
primary precedent, but the majority of the Court’s inquiry focuses on whether the 
expression in question communicated government endorsement of religion.  Lupu, 
supra note 93, at 808-10. 
 216. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 294 (explaining that this tradition in a heavily Baptist 
county was challenged by two families, one Catholic and the other Mormon). 
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question was not the private expression of the student chaplain, but 
had the appearance of school approval.217  The Court noted that the 
policy through which the student prayer-leader was selected 
encouraged religious messages.218  Because most students at the 
school would undoubtedly believe that the school supported the pre-
game prayer, the Court found that the practice violated the 
Establishment Clause.219 
2. Endorsing 12-Step programs in prison 
One lower court has used the Endorsement Test to scrutinize the 
religious nature of mandatory 12-Step programs in the prison 
context, and found improper government endorsement.220  In Griffin 
v. Coughlin, the Court of Appeals of New York emphasized that a 
secular objective would not rescue a program that delivered a 
religious message from Establishment Clause scrutiny.221  Defining the 
test, the court explained, “[a]n endorsement violating the 
Establishment Clause can be determined by examining whether the 
message that the government’s practice communicates may be fairly 
understood as favoring or promoting religion.”222  Based on this 
criterion, the court found that the prison practice of conditioning 
expanded family visiting privileges on participation in Alcoholics 
Anonymous upset the neutrality principle underlying the 
Establishment Clause.223  In choosing to promote the 12-Step 
program, prison managers essentially choose to favor a religious 
message.224 
3. Applying the Endorsement Test to the drug court setting 
Where drug courts mandate, or even encourage participation in a 
religious activity, without simultaneously providing a secular 
alternative, this constitutes endorsement.  As the Supreme Court held 
in Allegheny, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from 
                                                 
 217. See id. at 302 (noting that there was a specific school policy authorizing the 
student-led prayer, and that the prayer was delivered on government property at 
government-sponsored events). 
 218. Id. at 306. 
 219. Id. at 308. 
 220. Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 105 (N.Y. 1996). 
 221. See id. at 107-09 (explaining that the fact that the 12-Step program was 
primarily for rehabilitation did not affect the investigation of its religious 
components). 
 222. Id. at 108. 
 223. Id. at 106-07. 
 224. See id. at 108 (explaining that a “mandatory, exclusive program” with 
religious components “favors inmates who adhere to those beliefs, and symbolically 
condones the religious proselytizing those expressions literally reflect”). 
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taking a position on religious issues.225  When a judge recommends 
participation in a religious activity as a way for an individual to 
overcome an addiction, the judge is essentially telling the individual 
that the values promoted in the activity are those by which he must 
live in order to extricate himself from criminal justice scrutiny.226  
Within 12-Step programs, participants are instructed to adopt a 
particular belief system, and court endorsement of the program 
creates the unmistakable appearance of endorsement of that belief 
system.227  This kind of government expression sends a message to 
nonbelievers that “they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community,”228 and thus violates the Establishment Clause. 
The Endorsement Test does not prohibit the state from offering a 
12-Step program as one rehabilitative option.229  The test does, 
however, prohibit the government from offering only a religious-
based program in the drug court context.230  As in Allegheny, where the 
presence of several symbols negated the potential message of 
government endorsement of religion, a presentation of a different 
program option undermines any suggestion that the government 
prefers religion over non-religion.231  Therefore, if a drug court 
provides non-religious alternatives to the 12-Step program, and does 
not promote one over the other, it will withstand scrutiny under the 
Endorsement Test.232 
                                                 
 225. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (noting that the 
Establishment Clause also prevents the government from making religious practice 
relevant to an individual’s political standing). 
 226. See Steen, supra note 148, at 62 (emphasizing the role of the judge in both 
fashioning the treatment protocol and enforcing it).  A judge’s role in drug court is 
not only to ensure that a client completes a program, but it is also to praise the client 
for successful behavior in the program and to help the client understand the dangers 
of lapsing from it.  Id. 
 227. See Stanton Peele, Foreword to REBECCA FRANSWAY, 12-STEP HORROR STORIES:  
TRUE TALES OF MISERY, BETRAYAL, AND ABUSE 5-10 (2000) (describing the pressure new 
12-Step group members feel to adopt the values of the group, and referring to these 
programs as group “coercion and brainwashing”), available at http://www.peele.net/ 
lib/twelve.html. 
 228. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 229. See Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 815-16 (noting that it may be constitutional 
for states to offer religious programs in prisons as long as there are secular 
alternatives available and the overall system is neutral).  Apanovitch argues, however, 
that the principle of government distance from religion would be better served if 
only secular programs were offered.  Id. at 839-41. 
 230. Id. at 815-16. 
 231. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616-20 (1989) (finding that 
the grouping of a Chanukah menorah with secular symbols on city property did not 
convey government endorsement of religion). 
 232. Id.; see Smith, supra note 76, at 327-28 (describing a choice of programs as a 
“constitutional cure” to an Establishment Clause violation); see also Calabro, supra 
note 13, at 611 (arguing that while the state has a high interest in rehabilitating 
substance abusers, its interest in doing so exclusively via Alcoholics Anonymous 
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IV. 12-STEP DOMINANCE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ALTERNATIVES 
Despite the constitutional problems with 12-Step programs, they 
remain incredibly popular as part of many addiction recovery plans.233  
One of the primary reasons for this reliance is the cost.  The 
programs are either virtually or totally free both to participants and 
the courts,234 with any costs accrued borne by small donations from 
members.235  Furthermore, the programs have a wide range, and exist 
in nearly every corner of the United States.236 
In addition to their low cost and convenience, 12-Step programs 
are widely regarded as successful.237  Although there is little formal 
research on the approach,238 it is clear that the programs have helped 
thousands of people.239  While studies indicate that results are 
mixed,240 many people benefiting from the programs are true 
                                                 
participation, without alternatives, is unacceptable). 
 233. See MILTON A. MAXWELL, PH.D., THE AA EXPERIENCE:  A CLOSE-UP VIEW FOR 
PROFESSIONALS 1 (Thomas H. Quinn & Michael Hennelly eds., 1984) (describing the 
powerful influence of the 12-Step method in the addiction recovery field, and 
suggesting that it is crucial for treatment professionals to understand the features of 
the 12-Step “phenomenon”). 
 234. See Ethan G. Kalett, Twelve Steps, You’re Out (of Prison):  An Evaluation of 
“Anonymous Programs” as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 129, 148-49 (1996) 
(exploring the reasons behind the growing connection between 12-Step programs 
and the criminal justice system).  Because these programs are run by volunteers, they 
relieve the criminal justice system of many financial and administrative expenses.  Id. 
at 148.  Additionally, professionals widely accept 12-Step programs as an effective way 
to fight addiction.  Id. at 149. 
 235. See id. at 140 n.64 (explaining that “corporate poverty” was a deliberate 
decision by the young Alcoholics Anonymous organization so that they would not be 
distracted from their primary mission of helping persons addicted to alcohol). 
 236. See, e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous, A.A. Fact File, at http://www.alcoholics-
anonymous.org/default/en_about_aa_sub.cfm?subpageid=12&pageid=24    
(last visited Aug. 28, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) 
(estimating that they have over 100,000 groups worldwide); Narcotics Anonymous, 
Information About NA,  at http://www.na.org/basic.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2004) 
(on file with the American University Law Review) (reporting that, as of 2002, there 
were approximately 20,000 known groups, holding over 31,000 weekly meetings). 
 237. See Alisdair MacKenzie & Richard P. Allen, Alcoholics’ Evaluation of Alcoholism 
Treatment, 21-2 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 1 (2003) (reporting that in a study of the 
recommendations and criticisms of treatment clients, clients recommended 
Alcoholics Anonymous as one of two preferred treatment components). 
 238. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 156 (explaining that the singleness of purpose 
and tradition of anonymity complicate, if not outright preclude, the types of research 
that behavioral health scientists would like to do on the 12-Step model).  However, 
Alcoholics Anonymous itself has published that of its dedicated members, fifty 
percent became and remained sober, while twenty-five percent became sober after 
some relapses.  Id. 
 239. See Alcoholics Anonymous, Do You Think You’re Different, at http://www. 
alcoholics-anonymous.org/default/en_about_aa.cfm?pageid=12 (last visited Mar. 30, 
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (rebutting the lack of 
objective data with numerous anecdotal stories of individual success). 
 240. See, e.g., Don McIntire, How Well Does A.A. Work? An Analysis of Published A.A. 
Surveys (1968-1996) and Related Analyses/Comments 18-1 ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT Q. 1 
(2000) (concluding that the effectiveness of 12-Step programs remains unproven); 
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believers attributing their own recoveries to the 12-Step method and 
assuming it is also the best approach for other substance abusers.241 
There are effective alternatives to 12-Step programs, however, even 
for reluctant clients.  A number of programs have been developed 
specifically in response to perceived weaknesses and client objections 
to Anonymous programs.242  These alternative self-help support 
groups include Secular Organizations for Sobriety (S.O.S.),243 Women 
For Sobriety,244 SMART Recovery,245 and Rational Recovery.246  While 
there is little reliable data on the effectiveness of any of these 
                                                 
Chad Emrick, Overview:  Alcoholics Anonymous, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
ALCOHOLISM, VOLUME 7, TREATMENT RESEARCH 3, 4 (M. Galanter ed., 1989) 
(reporting that while Alcoholics Anonymous membership often results in high rates 
of abstinence, professionals are not able to reliably predict who will affiliate with the 
organization and who will be helped by it). 
 241. See BUFE, supra note 56, at 65 (suggesting that most people who have used 12-
Step programs to support their abstinence, including recovered addicts-turned-
counselors, believe recovery is not possible without going through the 12-Steps). 
 242. See WHITE, supra note 10, at 156-57 (exploring some of the criticisms of the 
12-Step method that have inspired others to create alternatives).  For instance, many 
feel that the religious concepts of Alcoholics Anonymous alienate and drive off non-
believers, that Alcoholics Anonymous replaces one dependency/addiction with 
another, and that reliance on the “Higher Power” prevents individuals from 
developing their internal strengths and competencies.  Id. 
 243. See Laura Flynn McCarthy, Beyond AA:  Alternatives for Alcoholics Who Resist the 
Program’s Religious Approach, HEALTH MAG., July/Aug. 1991, at 40, 43 (describing 
S.O.S. as one of the original alternatives to 12-Step programs, with meetings in many 
locations across the United States); see also BUFE, supra note 56, at 177 (explaining 
that people displeased with 12-Step groups often attend S.O.S. meetings to vent 
about the condescension and hostility they experienced in 12-Step groups, but 
facilitators are skilled at steering discussions back to methods of staying sober). 
 244. See Mary Jeffrey Stevens, Alternatives to AA:  Other Models for Dealing with 
Addictions, at http://www.uic.edu/orgs/convening/AA.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (endorsing the Women For 
Sobriety approach, with its Thirteen Statements of Acceptance that “help members 
become more self-reliant in everyday life and achieve a lasting and successful 
recovery”); BUFE, supra note 56, at 185 (describing this group as one that focuses on 
empowerment of women addicts, based on the premise that women have different 
emotional reasons for using substances, and require a different kind of recovery 
support). 
 245. See SMART Recovery, at http://www.smartrecovery.org (last visited Mar. 30, 
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (defining their purpose to 
provide support for those who want to abstain, or are considering abstinence from 
addictions, by changing individual behavior to achieve satisfaction and quality of 
life); see also BUFE, supra note 56, at 178-79 (explaining that the SMART program is 
based on cognitive behavioral self-help methods that allow participants to build 
motivation, cope with urges, learn to manage desires and actions, and build a 
balanced, happy life). 
 246. See Stevens, supra note 244 (providing an overview of the Rational Recovery 
approach as one that emphasizes individual power and encourages group 
participation to be limited to the short-term); BUFE, supra note 56, at 172 (reporting 
that Rational Recovery is based on experiences of people who recovered without 
help of any program and that it teaches individuals to recognize and overcome their 
“addictive voice” that spurs them into addictive behaviors). 
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approaches, anecdotal information and the rapid spread of some of 
these programs suggest their potential.247 
The most significant hurdle for drug courts hoping to offer an 
alternative to the 12-Step program is availability.  While 12-Step 
programs are nearly everywhere,248 the alternatives suggested above 
still have limited range.249  Each organization does, however, offer 
support in starting new groups, and some offer internet meetings or 
discussion groups.250 
Finding a way to offer one of these secular alternatives in drug 
courts will eliminate any Establishment Clause issue.251  More 
importantly, however, from a policy perspective is the expectation 
that having alternative approaches is likely to yield better 
rehabilitation results.252  12-Step programs work for many people, but 
not for everyone.253  Unfortunately, addiction research has not 
revealed what type of program will work best for each person, but 
there is evidence that those who are personally invested in their 
recovery achieve better results.254  Thus, programs that alienate 
                                                 
 247. See id. at 168 (noting that, while in 1980 Women for Sobriety was the only 
secular alternative to the 12-Step approach, there are a number of choices now, all of 
which report numerous victories in the fight against substance abuse).  These 
alternative organizations function, like the 12-Step programs, as self-help support 
groups and are offered free of charge or at little cost.  Id. 
 248. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of 12-
Step programs and reviewing the number of groups and meetings of popular 
organizations). 
 249. See, e.g., SMART Recovery, supra note 245 (listing only 300 face-to-face meeting 
groups worldwide); S.O.S., at http://www.cfiwest.org/sos/asp/result.asp?listtype= 
ListAll (last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) 
(listing only 122 meetings across the country). 
 250. See, e.g., SMART Recovery, supra note 245 (listing at least one internet chat or 
live voice online meeting each day of the week); Rational Recovery, at 
http://www.rational.org/faq.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2004) (on file with the 
American University Law Review) (offering online discussion groups with the caveat 
that they are not intended to serve as a permanent support resource, as the Rational 
Recovery program is intended to empower individuals to function without life-long 
reliance on support groups). 
 251. See, e.g., O’Connor v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding 
that the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by promoting a program with 
religious overtones when there were some, however few, secular alternatives). 
 252. See Lisa Rosenblum, Note, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1226-28 (2002) (reporting on the perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of several treatment modalities, including therapeutic communities, 
pharmacological treatment, and inpatient treatment). 
 253. See Peele, supra note 227 (introducing stories of individuals that had 
unsuccessful experiences with 12-Step programs because they were pressured to 
accept pro-forma explanations of their troubles and were convinced that any 
hesitation on their parts to admit their addictions or embrace the 12-Steps was 
destructive denial). 
 254. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL 
(TIP) SERIES 35:  ENHANCING MOTIVATION FOR CHANGE IN SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
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participants, or pressure an unwanted belief system on them are 
unlikely to assist individuals in overcoming their addiction.255 
CONCLUSION 
Drug Court evaluations suggest that the innovative combination of 
criminal and addiction rehabilitation concepts is making a difference 
in the criminal justice system, and that drug courts are meeting their 
goal of reducing recidivism.256  The problems associated with 
mandated 12-step participation need not interfere with these positive 
results.  Fortunately, solving the problems associated with 
encouraging participation in religiously-oriented 12-Step programs is 
easy:  to defeat both the Coercion Test and the Endorsement Test, 
drug courts need only offer a secular alternative when assigning a 12-
Step program as a treatment component.257  By offering a drug court 
participant the choice between religious and secular support groups, 
the state maintains its neutrality258 and provides the participants a 
better chance of treatment success.259 
Although this solution is not complicated, courts have been slow to 
recognize the issue, due in part to the prominence of 12-Step 
recovery programs, as well as misunderstandings about their religious 
                                                 
TREATMENT 5 (1999) (reporting on longitudinal research that indicates that an 
individual’s level of motivation is a “very strong predictor” of whether she or he will 
succeed in changing addictive behaviors). 
 255. See BUFE, supra note 56, at 65 (noting, however, that many formerly 
nonreligious members of Alcoholics Anonymous undergo a type of religious 
conversion during the program because while healthy, well-adjusted people normally 
do not change their views, it is not unusual for those in emotional crises to radically 
alter their beliefs). 
 256. See STEVEN BELENKO, RESEARCH ON DRUG COURTS:  A CRITICAL REVIEW, 2001 
UPDATE 1 (Nat’l Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia U. ed., 
2001) (reporting, based on the considerable amount of research there is on each 
drug court, that drug use and criminal activity are reduced while defendants are in 
the program), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/2001drugcourts. 
pdf.  Further, the fewer studies that do exist on long-term impacts tend to show a 
reduction in recidivism among persons who participated.  Id.  Other benefits 
attributed to drug courts are cost savings and the collaboration they bring to how the 
criminal justice system addresses drug offenders.  NATIONAL DRUG COURT INSTITUTE, 
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DRUG COURT SYSTEMS 7 (1999). 
 257. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655-56 (2002) (revealing that 
non-religious alternatives render the Coercion Test defeated); O’Connor v. 
California, 855 F. Supp. 303, 308 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that the ability of the 
probationer to pick among secular and religious programs meant the government 
had not endorsed a religious one). 
 258. Id. 
 259. See Steen, supra note 148, at 64-65 (emphasizing the large role that moral 
involvement with treatment can play in a substance abuser’s recovery).  Study results 
show that successful clients in their treatment programs seem to be morally involved 
in drug court.  Id. at 64. 
GALLAS.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 10/3/2004  5:57 PM 
1100 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1063 
nature.260  Because drug courts are a court-produced phenomenon, 
the best solution will be one that similarly comes from the courts 
themselves.261  However, because few have recognized the legal and 
policy questions related to mandating 12-Step participation, it would 
be helpful for professional organizations involved in the drug court 
field to address the issue in their training materials and 
conferences.262  While each drug court operates alone, they are not 
isolated from the experience and advice of others, nor are they 
operating without sources for technical support.263  While offering 
alternatives may be easy in large urban areas where non-12-Step 
programs already exist, in smaller settings the transition could be 
more challenging.264  Yet, together with the local treatment provider, 
judges can craft individual solutions to ensure that each treatment 
protocol will offer appropriate choices for the participant.  The best 
chance participants have for recovery is a creative judge following the 
latest research, and working closely with treatment providers. 
For most drug courts, this change will have little impact. 
Participating in a 12-Step program is an important, but not 
irreplaceable, component of the treatment provided to a 
participant.265  Not only does offering a secular alternative answer the 
Establishment Clause concerns, but it makes sense to provide drug 
                                                 
 260. See BUFE, supra note 56, at 65 (noting that while in Alcoholics Anonymous, 
religion is presented as the primary solution to addiction, this fact is seldom 
mentioned in either the media or professional journals).  When this fact is 
highlighted in the media, it is often accompanied by the claim that Alcoholics 
Anonymous’ program is not religious, but rather merely spiritual.  Id. 
 261. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (describing the judicial creation 
of the drug court model).  While a legislative directive to provide alternatives to 12-
Step programs could be effective, it would require a legislature to single out the 12-
Step model in order to ensure that any restrictions imposed would have the intended 
effect.  It is likely that this would not be a politically palatable move, because of the 
wide-spread support that 12-Step programs receive, as well as public misconceptions 
of addiction and recovery. 
 262. See National Association of Drug Court Professionals, at http://www.nadcp.org/ 
about/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) 
(describing their mission as support and technical assistance for drug courts, and 
listing training conferences and other resources); Office of Justice Programs Drug Court 
Clearinghouse and Technical Assistance Project, at http://spa.american.edu/justice/ 
drugcourts.asp (last visited July 30, 2004) (on file with the American University Law 
Review) (listing facilitation of discussion on issues of concern, individual 
consultations, and responses to information requests among the services offered). 
 263. See, e.g., National Drug Court Institute, at http://www.ndci.org/aboutndci.htm 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) 
(providing numerous training and technical assistance opportunities for new and 
established drug courts). 
 264. See, e.g., SMART Recovery, supra note 245 (listing current programs primarily 
in large urban areas); Rational Recovery, supra note 250. 
 265. See supra notes 241-47 and accompanying text (describing alternatives to 12-
Step programs). 
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court participants with the chance to become involved in a support 
group with which they are comfortable.  This will increase their 
chances of successful treatment, which in turn will increase the 
likelihood that they will not go back through the revolving door of 
drug use, crime, and punishment.266 
 
                                                 
 266. See NOLAN, JR., supra note 29, at 39 (describing the drug court movement as a 
“revolution” in criminal justice because of the innovative collaboration between the 
fields of addiction treatment and criminal justice). 
